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Abstract—Dealing with Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) com-
ponents is a daily business for avionic system manufacturers.
They are necessary ingredients for hardware designs, but are
not built in accordance with the avionics consensus standard DO-
254 for Airborne Electronic Hardware (AEH) design. Especially
for complex COTS hardware components used in safety critical
AEH, like Microcontroller Units (MCUs), additional assurance
activities have to be performed. All of them together shall form
a convincing confident, that the hardware is safe in its intended
operation environment. The focus of DO-254 is one approach
called Design Assurance (DA). Its aim is to reduce design errors
by adherence of prescribed process objectives for the entire
design life cycle. The effort for certain COTS assurance activities
could be reduced if it is possible to demonstrate, that the COTS
design process is based on similar effective design process guide-
lines to minimize desgin errors. In the last years, semiconductor
manufacturers released safety MCUs in compliance to the ISO
26262 standard, dedicated for the development of functional safe
automotive systems. These products are COTS components in
the sense of avionics, but they are also developed according to
a process that focuses on reduction of design errors. In this
paper an evaluation is performed to figure out if the ISO 26262
prescribes a similar DA approach as the DO-254, in order to
reduce the COTS assurance effort for coming avionic systems.
Index Terms—AEH, ECMP, COTS, Microcontroller, SoC,
Avionic, Certification, DO-254, ISO 26262, COTS assurance
I. INTRODUCTION
For development of AEH COTS components are an in-
escapable ingredient. From simple electronic hardware such
as serial peripheral controller, to complex electronic hardware,
like a Microprocessor Unit (MPU), COTS components are
widely used in safety critical avionic systems today. The avail-
ability of suitable MPUs for safety critical AEH is reducing.
MCUs1 have a bigger market share and should be considered
for future developments. Their high degree of functional
integration can realize the majority of avionic system design
requirements. However, the inherent complexity of a system-
on-a-chip is very high and methods for COTS assurance
to establish certification conformity are still an open topic
of discussion in aerospace [1]. The reason is that, function
blocks formerly developed in own responsibility by aviation
1Here also referenced as COTS component.
industry are now part of the MCU. Its whole design life cycle
became supplier controlled and is not necessarily aligned to
AEH needs coming from certification or targeted operation
context. The certification applicant has to demonstrate that
the COTS component reached the same level of confidence as
it would be achievable by an in-house design using aviation
processes, w.r.t. the reasonably reduction of design errors.
The concept of this process based evidence is called DA2. It
claims a structured and requirement driven process intended to
mitigate design errors, which could not be exposed otherwise
due to the potential lack of complete verification [2]. The
industry consensus standard DO-254 [3] and further guidance
of certification authorities define the DA approach for AEH
and how it could be adapted depending on different levels
of safety implications induced by the hardware in a given
system context. In order to be aligned with certification
recommendations, adherence of that approach is an integral
part of the argumentation about safe operation of an AEH or
its inherent COTS components.
Summarized, MCUs shall be integrated certification compli-
ant into the AEH and it is necessary within an COTS assurance
process to demonstrate that the MCU design process produced
the level of integrity3 required for AEH. An evaluation be-
tween an appropriate MCU design process and the DO-254 is
needed to determine it.
This paper is organized as follows: In section II a short
overview is given about current industrial practises for COTS
assurance and research projects that contributed in this field.
Section III describes in III-A and III-B the challenge and
method for the evaluation between the DO-254 and an MCU
design process. In section III-C the evaluation is performed
and findings for each examined DO-254 hardware design life
cycle process are delivered. Section IV contains a conclusion
with ideas for future work.
2In context of airborne system and software development also known as
development assurance.
3Convincing confident about no unexposed design errors reaching the final
product.DOI: 10.1109/DASC.2017.8102145 c© 2017 IEEE
II. CERTIFICATION PRACTICE
Although the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) have different
positions about the application scope [4], [5] of the guidance
document DO-254 [3], it is still the current recommended
industry consensus standard for certification compliant devel-
opment of AEH. DO-254 deals with a process model that is
created around the principle of design assurance and contains
additional considerations for the use of COTS components,
mainly through an electronic component management process
(section 11.2 in [3]) and product service experience (section
11.3 in [3]). In the past, it was unsuccessfully attempted to
demonstrate DO-254 design assurance compliance by means
of reverse engineering of required process artefacts of an
MPU. After years, it was clear that this is not a practical ap-
proach [6]. With this lack in mind the certification authorities
assigned several research projects to investigate the potential
risks and challenges of different COTS technologies and how
they can be addressed to satisfy certification requirements. As
a result, further guidance materials were derived to enable
complex COTS component usage in AEH.
Between 2006 and 2011, The Aerospace Vehicle Systems
Institute (AVSI) project Authority for Expenditure (AFE)
No. 43, released five research reports ( [7], [8], [9], [10],
[11]) and a handbook [12] addressing the use of MPUs in
airborne systems. These reports and the handbook introduced
the concept of safety nets, i.e. the employment of mitigations
and protections at appropriate levels to protect against unex-
pected behaviour of an MPU. In the following AVSI AFE-
75 project (performed between 2011-2013), the scope was
extended to cover all kinds of COTS components including
COTS assemblies. AVSI AFE-75 found more than 20 issues on
the use of COTS electronics in AEH [1]. Special attention was
given to attain a consistent application of safety and reliability
guidance for all aerospace companies certifying under FAA
[13]. In 2012, EASA released the certification memorandum
(CM) CM-SWCEH-001 [14] to address design assurance of
airborne electronic hardware. Section 9 in the CM-SWCEH-
001 addresses guidelines for COTS digital AEH while section
10 covers the use of COTS graphical processors. Through
section 9, EASA extends the application scope of DO-254 to
include complex and even highly complex COTS components
such as multicore processors as part of the AEH design. This
is performed through different activities (from 2 up to 16),
depending on device complexity and design assurance level.
These activities were partially derived by research findings
in [15]. The refined process description is a reasonable guid-
ance coming from experience over many certification projects.
In addition, the CM allows using alternative methods for
COTS devices, such as reverse engineering of DO-254 life
cycle data or other means of compliance. In practice, reverse
engineering will be harder to perform the more complex the
device is, since typically no detailed design data are provided
by the COTS manufacturer. In later years, guidance for use
of multicore processors in AEH have been jointly defined by
many certification authorities in the Certification Authorities
Software Team (CAST) paper No. 32A [16].
In practice, for COTS components different design assur-
ance methods may be used in conjunction with each other,
including the additional design assurance methods described
in Appendix B in DO-254 [3]. These are:
Architectural mitigation It uses architectural design features
to mitigate hardware design and implementation errors.
Typically, monitors and dissimilar components may be
used for COTS. The safety net approach described by
[12] belongs to this approach.
Product service experience It identifies the service experi-
ence data and then establishes that the service experience
data demonstrates that the reused functionality of the
hardware is sufficiently exercised during previous uses of
the hardware. EASAs CM [14] extends DO-254s product
service experience scope with a COTS based service
experience approach. The FAA report FAA [13] also
gives guidance for the use of service experience.
Advanced verification methods It includes elemental analy-
sis, safety-specific analysis (SSA), and formal methods.
Elemental analysis requires details about the design and
is therefore less suitable for COTS devices. SSA may
be used as an additional design assurance approach, but
may also require some details about the internal design of
the device [17]. SSA focuses on exposing design errors
that could adversely affect the hardware outputs from
a system safety perspective [3]. Formal methods apply
mathematics to prove correctness of a design and has
according to the authors not been extensively used for
airborne COTS design assurance. The determination and
validation of the usage domain described in Section 9 in
EASAs CM [14], may also be assigned to this category.
The validity of the usage domain is ensured by a set of
verification activities.
Extended electronic component management It addresses
control mechanisms on the COTS manufacturer by means
of detailed design data, how errata is maintained and
published, how device data is configuration controlled,
and how change impact analysis is performed.4
Reverse engineering In this way the life cycle data required
by DO-254 are created from available COTS data or
created from various reverse engineering techniques such
as x-raying the components or detailed tests.
These methods are used complementary as means for COTS
assurance or to build up the DA strategy. The assurance
process is not a proof, but rather an accumulation of elements
that leads to bringing the conviction of industrial partners
and certification authorities that the equipment embedding
complex COTS hardware is safe [18]. Currently, it is the
Certification Review Item (CRI) type of document5, requested
by the certification authority that functions as the container
4Extended by the means of the EASA-CM [14].
5For FAA type certifications, issue papers are the requested type of
document.
for the assurance strategy of complex COTS components e.g.
MPUs [19].
III. DESIGN ASSURANCE EVALUATION
The previous chapter stated that a COTS assurance process
is composed of different methods. The recognition of the
COTS design process as a supplementary argument for the
design integrity and is not often considered in industrial
practise. It is required to collect as much assurance as possible,
and process based evidence is one type of that.
If it could be demonstrated that the resulting integrity level
of the MCU design process is comparable to the one of DO-
254; this could establish a base of trustworthiness for all other
assurance activities.
The concept of DA in DO-254 is defined as planned and
systematic actions used to substantiate [...], that design errors
have been identified and corrected [...] [3]. The extent of
DA guidance, according to the title of DO-254, goes with
error mitigation strategies beyond error avoidance. Thus, it is
necessary to design the hardware such that it safely performs
its function as intended also under anomalous behaviour.
However, the evaluation precludes these fault tolerance or
fail-safe aspects in order to concentrate on the overall design
approach. So activities for fault avoidance to minimize design
errors are separated from fault mitigation techniques that
reduce consequences triggered by these errors.
A. Challenge
Aviation industry has another perspective on hardware de-
sign compared to most semiconductor manufacturer. This is
logical since COTS components are targeted to domains with
different claims according to design and safety goals; and
the avionics industry is not among the biggest players in
embedded systems. Nevertheless, avoidance of design errors is
also a business case for COTS or semiconductor manufacturers
in order to mitigate the risk of an economic loss by product
recalls. The used approach is sufficient for this trade-off but
not necessarily from a safety perspective which would cause
an increased workload to reach a higher confidence.
The possible DA misalignment is a widespread opinion in
aerospace, but it could not be carefully substantiated during
a literature search. Origin of this attitude can be that only
the DO-254 approach and its naming is in mind when this
topic is discussed. Indeed, there are also references that if the
COTS design process is requirements driven it could be based
on similar approach as the one described in DO-254 [15].
Findings in [20] demonstrates that the verification phase of
COTS components could be more comprehensive as it is
required in DO-254, but because it is not compliant to DO-254
no certification credit can be claimed. Every single domain,
especially safety-related one, is aware about the consequences
of systematic faults and intend to reduce their likelihood
of occurrence. It is generally accepted that no quantitative
methods are available to measure how many possible design
errors are present after a certain approach [21]. Because we
cannot demonstrate how well we have done, we will show
how hard we have tried [22]. So specific expert judgement
and best practices are promoted for each domain as sufficient
mean. These circumstance makes a comparison or evaluation
quite difficult.
B. Method
1) Evaluation Goal: For the evaluation a terminology is
needed as comparison scale between both processes. The
known concept of Hardware Design Assurance Level (HW-
DAL)6 from DO-254 is not used. This concept is not in-
dependent since it is interwoven with the avionic domain
and it proportionally depends on the severity of the failure
condition caused by the malfunction of the hardware. For the
evaluation the naming of integrity level is proposed, since
it is independent of a domain or corresponding standard. In
[21] it is stated that DA [...] establishes a level of confidence
that the [...] [design] has been accomplished in a sufficiently
disciplined, rigorous manner to limit the likelihood of [design]
errors [...]. The integrity level represents this confidence about
the limitation of design errors as property of the DA process.
Like a gap-analysis are the differences between the design
approach of an MCU and the DO-254 identified. The eval-
uation goal is to qualitatively assess these differences of the
COTS design approach w.r.t. their impact of the integrity level.
The evaluation focus is on avoidance of design errors com-
pared against the DO-254 guidance. Therefore, a determined
integrity level is qualitatively given in relation to the DO-
254. This ensures the applicability of evaluation results for
the COTS assurance case.
2) Definition of Avionics Evaluation Base: The DO-254
is one single document, but also has interdependencies with
the ARP4754A [23] and DO-178C [24] standards on system
and software level. This structure is derived by a top down
development concept, starting at the aircraft system level.
Safety and functional requirements are broken down to the
hardware levels. This ensures the satisfaction of important
safety aspects that are an overall system property. The sys-
tem safety assessment is conducted in conjunction with the
hardware design team, but it is not in responsibility or scope
of DO-254 hardware design life cycle that started at document
section 3. At this point all implications on hardware regarding
safety have to be formulated as safety requirements. During
the whole design life cycle the assurance of safety is still in
mind, but it is formalized as requirements that have to be
correctly implemented.
The evaluation results shall be used within a DA strategy
for a highly safety critical COTS component. The DO-254
introduces an assurance level approach to determine the pro-
cess guidance by means of different severity stages in case of a
malfunction. HWDAL A or B have to be considered for highly
safety critical systems with catastrophic or hazardous failure
conditions. For both, the same guidance set is applicable and
thus they are considered for the evaluation. If the examination
findings shall be reused for lower HWDAL, it can be adjusted
afterwards.
6On system level it is called item development assurance level.
The relevant DO-254 process guidance, considered for the
evaluation, is located form chapter 3 to appendix B. For
reasons of clarity and comprehensibility, further certification
guidance materials for the DO-254 are skipped for the present.
Despite, it is necessary to bear in mind these additional
documents if a later certification is intended. For a further
evaluation iteration they will be considered.
3) Determination of a suitable COTS Evaluation Base: As
counterpart for the evaluation an MCU should be selected that
is potentially appropriate also in technical aspects7. Its design
approach should have similarities to the DO-254 in following
properties:
Standard Based The MCU manufacturer derived its design
process from a widespread standard. This enables the
evaluation on a higher abstraction level when comparing
the DO-254 with another standard. Additionally, assess-
ment results can be reused for other products realized in
accordance to the same standard.
Process or product centred A design process can consist
of requirements on the product to define its nominal
performance that shall be designed or on the process.
The DO-254 does not claim requirements on the product
performance. Only for DA some aspects are prescribed
like architectural mitigation that have an impact on the
product design.
Avoidance of systematic errors This should be explicitly
stated or be a recognizable goal of the process. An
assurance level approach that defines the process rigour
is a good indication for that.
By searching for MCU candidates on the market, automo-
tive products developed in compliance to the ISO 26262 [25]
were identified. The design process is derived in compliance
to the ISO 26262 which satisfies the above mentioned criteria.
This process is based on a widespread standard that also
focuses on hardware design. The ISO 26262 was specified for
the development of functional safe electrical and/or electronic
systems in a passenger car and highlighted the avoidance of
design errors as one goal. This is achieved by an assurance
level based design approach. Like DO-254, ISO 26262 defines
process requirements to ensure the integrity of the design. The
specification of nominal product performance is not considered
by ISO 26262.
Especially this third party assessed and safety aware stan-
dard compliant design process is an advantage for AEH
manufacturer. The process is still controlled by the COTS
supplier but the framework is public. For a safety-aware
process the reachable level of integrity is likely rather higher
than for an MCU designed for the consumer market. For
several years semiconductor manufacturers provided such kind
of safety MCUs. They reach a high diagnostic coverage by
the integration of safety mechanisms to reduce chip external
provisions. These complex MCUs are equipped with a mixture
7The technical suitability and associated certification effort are not consid-
ered here.
of enough computing performance and interfaces, so they are
appropriate for e.g. unmanned air vehicle applications.
The ISO 26262 consists of ten parts which together specify
how a functional safe system, composed of software and
hardware, shall be developed on vehicle level. Basically, the
standard defines a top down development approach like in the
aviation domain. However, a tailored life cycle is proposed,
called Safety Element out of Context (SEooC), to enable the
development of generic components, like an MCU, indepen-
dent of a specific system developement. The ISO 26262 part
5 with the title: Product development at the hardware level
and all referenced parts have to be considered for the SEooC
approach and as consequence also for the evaluation.
4) Evaluation Procedure: DO-254 section 1.7 states that
if alternative processes are used as the one described in
DO-254, it has to be evaluated if objectives are fulfilled
with the same level of DA. This is also the target of this
evaluation, to examine if the described ISO 26262 processes
enable a similar integrity level of the designed hardware. This
is done for each DO-254 process expecting the certification
liaison, since this is not a comparable process for the ISO
26262 as for its adherence no governmental authorities are
responsible nor claim it. An accredited organization like the
TU¨V SU¨D is able to verify that a semiconductor manufacturer
developed an MCU compliant to the ISO 26262. The standard
do not describe the interdependencies between certification
organisation and the company applying it.
Every specified DO-254 process defines objectives and
activities that formulates the guidance on how to accomplish
the objectives. Associations between objectives and activities
are not explicitly described. However, for the evaluation it is
helpful to understand the linkage between them, because the
activities are more descriptive as the objectives, so they are
more suitable for the evaluation.8 The ISO 26262 specifies for
each process requirements which are formulated on a similar
abstraction level as the DO-254 activities.
The evaluation procedure starts with DO-254 activities and
map them with suitable ISO 26262 requirements.9 In order
to facilitate the mapping, the DO-254 activities are excerpted
and reduced to the essentials. After this, all associations are
established between DO-254 objectives, DO-254 activities
and ISO 26262 requirements. In order to make a statement
about the ISO 26262 compliance of each DO-254 objective,
all associations form ISO 26262 requirements via DO-254
activities to DO-254 objectives are considered. From table II
to X these associations are shown. To build these relations,
it is necessary to interpret the equivalence between the DO-
254 activities and the ISO 26262 requirements, because each
standard uses its own vocabulary. For readability reasons,
associated ISO 26262 requirements and DO-254 activities are
only presented as item numbers. At the end of each process
evaluation a qualitative statement is presented if the process
8Objectives and activities related to certification liaison process are omitted.
9As described in III-B1, the evaluation or mapping is only preformed
against the DO-254 processes.
Table I: Hardware Design Life Cycle Process Mapping
DO-254 ISO 26262
Ref Name Ref Name
4 Planning Process 5-5 Initiation of Product
Development at the
Hardware Level
5.1 Requirements
Capture Process
5-6
8-6
Specification of
Hardware Safety
Requirements
5.2 Conceptual Design
Process
5-7.4.1 Hardware Architec-
tural Design
5.3
5.4
Detailed Design and
Implementation Pro-
cess
5-7.4.2 Hardware Detailed
Design
5.5 Product Transition
Process
5-7.4.5 Product,
Operation and
Decommissioning
6 Validation and Verifi-
cation Process
8-9
8-6
5-6
5-7.4.4
5-10
Verification
7 Configuration Man-
agement Process
8-7
8-8
Configuration and
Change Management
8 Process Assurance 2-6 Safety Management
during the Concept
and the Product De-
velopment
according to ISO 26262 reach a comparable integrity level as
the corresponding DO-254 process.
The ISO 26262 defines an assurance level approach called
Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL), where D is the
level that claims the highest amount of risk reduction. All
requirements and methods of the ISO 26262 applicable for
ASIL D are considered.
C. Realisation
Before the evaluation is done according to the procedure
described in III-B4, hardware design life cycles of both
standards should be compared in order to give an overview
about the applied process mapping. Table I shows all DO-
254 hardware life cycle processes relevant for the evaluation
with the best associable ISO 26262 processes. Even though,
the configuration management is mappable and an important
process in a design life cycle, it is not considered in this
evaluation since the ISO 26262 referencing another standard
at this place. The reference numbering syntax of ISO 26262
processes in table I comprised at first a qualifier for the ISO
26262 part number, a hyphen as separator and then the chapter
numbering. In section III-C it is outlined how suitable this
mapping is w.r.t. the DO-254 intention of the processes.
Neither ISO 26262 nor DO-254 prescribe a life cycle model,
since this is not a part of the evaluation.10 Both standards
define a reference process model that indicates the idealized
process sequencing and remarks that they may be iterative
entered and re-entered with feedback flows. This depends on
many factors and has to be defined by the applicant.
10The mentioned V-model in ISO 26262 is just for reference.
Table II: Planning Process Mapping
DO-254 Objectives
1) The hardware design life cycle processes are defined.
2) Standards are selected and defined.
3) The hardware development and verification environments are selected or
defined.
DO-254 ISO 26262
Obj
Nr
Act
Nr
Req Nr
1. 1. 5-5.4.1; 2-6.4.3.5e; 2-6.4.4.1
1. 4. 2-6.4.3.5g,h
1. 5. 2-6.4.3.5g,h
1. 9. 2-6.4.3.5f
2. 3. 5-7.4.2.411
3. 6. 5-5.4.1; 2-6.4.3.5l
3. 8. 2-6.4.4.2; 2-7.4.1
3. 10. 2-6.4.8.1; 2-6.4.9.2 ;2-6.4.7.1
3. 11. 2-6.4.7.1
1) Planning Process: The value of planning the hardware
design life cycle are considered by both standards in the same
way. An MCU developed compliant to ISO 26262 is realized
as SEooC and has to include planning activities from ISO
26262 part 2 at system level to fulfil the planning needs as a
whole.
The DO-254 objective one is fully satisfied by the defined
activities in ISO 26262, see mapping in table II. Subcontractor
dependencies and the control of stipulated activities are ex-
tensively described in ISO 26262, since this is a widespread
approach in the automotive industry. The dedicated request
for design standards is not part of the planning phase of
the ISO 26262, but it is mentioned during the design phase.
The diligence on definition and description of the hardware
verification and design environment are on an equivalent level.
Tool assessment is addressed by ISO 26262 as an explicit
supporting process. Like in the DO-254, it should be ensure
that used tools for design and verification perform on an
acceptable level of confidence. Although, this is a relevant
aspect for avoiding design errors, it is not addressed in this
evaluation in detail.
Evaluation findings The planning process of the ISO 26262
is broadly the same, see mapping in table II. No explicit
need for creation of own defined hardware design stan-
dards is stated in the planning process, but this difference
is not enough to deprecate the possible integrity level. It
is assumed, that such kind of coding guidelines are part
of a robust design flow and claimed by ISO 26262 in the
hardware detailed design process. The integrity level is
evaluated as equal →.12
2) Requirements Capture Process: Both standards describe
a requirement driven design flow and define a dedicated pro-
cess for the capturing and specification of requirements. The
12Tool assessment approach is not considered.
Table III: Requirement Capture Process Mapping
DO-254 Objectives
1) Requirements are identified, defined and documented. [...]
2) Derived requirements produced are fed back to the appropriate process.
3) Requirements omissions and errors are provided to the appropriate
process for resolution.
DO-254 ISO 26262
Obj
Nr
Act
Nr
Req Nr
1. 1. 8-6.4.2.3; 5-6.4.2
1. 2. 8-6.4.2.5a,c
1. 3. 5-6.4.1
1. 4. 5-6.4.1; 5-6.4.2
1. 6. 8-6.4.2.4e
1. 8. 8-6.4.3.1; 8-6.4.3.2a,b
2. 5. 5-6.4.9
3. 7. 5-6.4.9
mapping in table III shows that six DO-254 activities are asso-
ciated to objective one. They describe that requirements from
different sources shall be reasonably identified, documented
and linked to each other. Safety and derived requirements are
emphasized. The source of a requirement could be the system
level process or design constraints. A derived requirement
is a requirement that is an interpretation of an allocated
system requirement or a consequence of a design constraint
and is defined to be implementable on the hardware level.
The ISO 26262 also knows concepts of derived requirements
but concentrates on safety related requirements. Requirements
without safety relationships can be managed outside of the
ISO 26262 life cycle. This is not the case for the DO-254.
Bidirectional traceability between hierarchical requirements
levels are requested by both standards. According to DO-
254 objective two and three, the ISO 26262 specifies that all
hardware requirements have to be verified with higher level
specifications.
Evaluation findings The concentration on safety-related re-
quirements, in the requirements capture phase of the
ISO 26262, could cause misunderstandings by managing
non-safety-related requirements in another way. However,
according to ISO 26262 design process all requirements,
even non-safety requirements, have to be handled within
one development process. The DO-254 clearly states that
all allocated requirements have to be considered. It is a
debatable point whether it is practical in a real develop-
ment to separate the managing of some requirements, but
it is possible. Such a situation could increase the potential
of design errors. This cause an integrity level deprecation
of the ISO 26262 ց.
3) Conceptual Design Process: Within the conceptual de-
sign phase, the hardware architecture shall be defined. All
components are described with their interactions with one
another on a higher level description, like the detailed design
afterwards.
Table IV: Conceptual Design Process Mapping
DO-254 Objectives
1) The hardware item conceptual design is developed consistent with its
requirements.
2) Derived requirements produced are fed back to the requirements capture
or other appropriate processes.
3) Requirements omissions and errors are provided to the appropriate
process for resolution.
DO-254 ISO 26262
Obj
Nr
Act
Nr
Req Nr
1. 1. 5-7.4.1.1
1. 2. 5-7.4.1.1; 5-7.4.1.5; 5-7.4.3.5a
1. 5. 5-7.4.1.1; 5-7.4.1.6
2. 3. –
3. 4. 5-7.4.4.2a
aOrigin outside the mapped process.
The ISO 26262 is also aligned with the objective num-
ber one, refer table IV. The requirements implemented in
the hardware architecture shall be traceable to the lowest
level of hardware component. If safety specific architectural
constraints are formulated as hardware safety requirements,
they are considered in the architecture. Unused functions are
addressed in ISO 26262 if they have a safety impact. In this
case, their independence has to be demonstrated. The feedback
of derived requirements according DO-254 objective two is not
explicitly described in ISO 26262. Problems with requirements
are communicated in the verification phase as specified in ISO
26262.
Evaluation findings The ISO 26262 fulfils the objectives,
see table IV. The DO-254 emphasizes safety-related
aspects of the hardware architecture, that should usually
be introduced by requirements coming from the safety
assessment. ISO 26262 does not explicit mention that
also in this phase requirements could be derived, but the
incremental re-entering of the requirement specification
phase could be performed13. The ISO 26262 process is
considered on an equal level of integrity →.
4) Detailed Design and Implementation Process: Detailed
design and implementation are separate processes in DO-
254. ISO 26262 does not describe a dedicated phase for
implementation of the design. It is assumed as a part of
the overall hardware design phase, that is ending with a
component ready for test activities. Both tables V and VI
show that most of the mapped ISO 26262 requirements do
not originating from the dedicated ISO 26262 processes used
as evaluation counterpart. So the concrete activities mentioned
by the DO-254 processes have to be associated, on the ISO
26262 side, with requirements from other phases.
The first objective of the detailed design process is respected
by the ISO 26262. However, the highlighting of safety aware-
13See footnote table IV.
Table V: Detailed Design Process Mapping
DO-254 Objectives
1) The detailed design is developed from the hardware item requirements
and conceptual design data.
2) Derived requirements are fed back to the conceptual design process or
other appropriate processes.
3) Requirements omissions and errors are provided to the appropriate
process for resolution.
DO-254 ISO 26262
Obj
Nr
Act
Nr
Req Nr
1. 1. 5-7.4.4.1a
1. 2. 5-7.4.1.1a
1. 3. 5-7.4.1.6a
1. 4. 5-7.4.3.5a
1. 5. 5-7.4.2.2
2. 6. –
3. 7. 5-7.4.4.2 a
aOrigin outside the mapped process.
ness during this phase is not done by ISO 26262 since these
features have to be defined as hardware safety requirements.
One obvious difference between both standards is that the
DO-254 claims requirement traceability down to the detailed
design, whereas for the ISO 26262 it ends at the conceptual
design.
The objectives related to derived requirements and omis-
sions in both DO-254 processes14 are treated by the ISO
26262 in the same way. There is no certain attention given
on this aspect, expect that the hardware has to be designed in
compliance to its requirements.
For the implementation process objective one and two, the
ISO 26262 do not prescribe any requirements that could be
directly traced. It is implicitly included in the design phase.
Evaluation findings The DO-254 separates the design from
the implementation in a better way. The ISO 26262 gives
no hint to start the implementation with the same means
the later production product is produced. This ensures
that most of the verification activities can be performed
with a hardware really close to the final versions. This
deviation and the fact that the requirement traceability is
not continuously established down to the detailed design,
leads to the implication that the ISO 26262 has a lower
integrity level w.r.t. these phases ց.
5) Product Transition Process: The series production is
out of the scope of the DO-254, but preparation of data for
production is treated. As shown in table VII, the mapped ISO
26262 requirements originate from the system level production
and hardware level phase. Together they fulfil the DO-254
objectives one, two and four. The emphasized feedback of
derived requirements claimed by objective three could not be
determined in ISO 26262 like for the other processes.
14See table V and VI.
Table VI: Implementation Process Mapping
DO-254 Objectives
1) A hardware item is produced which implements the hardware detailed
design using representative manufacturing processes.
2) The hardware item implementation, assembly and installation data is
complete.
3) Derived requirements are fed back to the detailed design process or other
appropriate processes.
4) Requirements omissions and errors are provided to the appropriate
process for resolution.
DO-254 ISO 26262
Obj
Nr
Act
Nr
Req Nr
1. 1. –
2. 1. –
3. 2. –
4. 3. 5-7.4.4.2a
aOrigin outside the mapped process.
Table VII: Product Transition Process Mapping
DO-254 Objectives
1) A baseline is established that includes all design and manufacturing data
needed to support the consistent replication of the hardware item.
2) Manufacturing requirements related to safety are identified and docu-
mented and manufacturing controls are established.
3) Derived requirements are fed back to the implementation process or other
appropriate processes.
4) Errors and omissions are provided to the appropriate processes for
resolution.
DO-254 ISO 26262
Obj
Nr
Act
Nr
Req Nr
1. 1. 4-11.4.2.2a
1. 2. 4-11.4.1.1a
1. 5. 4-11.4.1.1a
2. 4. 5-7.4.5.1; 5-7.4.5.2
3. 3. –
4. 6. 4-11.4.2.3a
aOrigin outside the mapped process.
Evaluation findings The ISO 26262 plans in a very simi-
lar manner the product transition like DO-254. Derived
requirements feedback and the concrete manufacturer
control are not mentioned by ISO 26262, but this does
not lead to a deprecation for the evaluation. The resulted
integrity level of this process is comparable →.
6) Validation and Verification Process: In DO-254 and ISO
26262, validation and verification are supporting processes.
This means, that they are concurrently performed with the
former evaluated design processes. Between validation and
verification no differentiation is stated in ISO 26262 in the
way like in the DO-254. The supporting process verification
in ISO 26262 part 8 is the conceptual root where the pro-
cess is described in general. At hardware level, validation
Table VIII: Validation Process Mapping
DO-254 Objectives
1) Derived hardware requirements against which the hardware item is to
be verified are correct and complete.
2) Derived requirements are evaluated for impact on safety.
3) Omissions and errors are fed back to the appropriate processes for
resolution.
DO-254 ISO 26262
Obj
Nr
Act
Nr
Req Nr
1. 1. 5-6.4.2; 8-6.4.3.4
1. 2. 8-6.4.3.1e; 8-6.4.3.3; 8-9.4.1.1c
1. 4. 5-6.4.9b
1. 5. 5-6.4.9d
1. 6. 8-9.4.3.2a
2. 3. 5-6.4.2
3. 7. 5-7.4.4.2
tasks, in the sense of DO-254, are linked at the requirement
specification15. Further, verification according to DO-254 is
associated to hardware design verification16 and testing17 on
hardware level. This is the reason for the variation in ISO
26262 references in table VIII and IX. The DO-254 also
describes validation and verification tasks at hardware level,
but focused these aspects in the same document chapters as
the process description. Hence, the ISO 26262 is applied to
the entire system development it defines another document
structure.
Table VIII shows that for every described DO-254 activity
one or more ISO 26262 requirements could be mapped to
adequately fulfil the DO-254 objectives. The validation or the
verification of lower level hardware requirements against the
system specification is claimed in a diligent manner. The ISO
26262 postulates validation means like inspections, reviews
and semi-formal methods.
Also, table IX demonstrates a sufficient mapping of DO-254
activities with ISO 26262 requirements of comparable content.
The DO-254 stated that hardware requirements can be verified
at a higher hierarchical level. It is not necessary to verify
all requirements at the level of the detailed design. However,
the traceability down to that level should be established to
verify the completeness or test coverage. The ISO 26262
verification means do not induce the same rigour as claimed by
the advanced verification means in DO-254 appendix B. The
level of independence for verification, requested in DO-254
appendix A, is not considered in ISO2626218.
Evaluation findings Both standards have different meanings
of the term validation and verification. This is not a show
stopper for reaching the same level of integrity. However,
15Section 5-6 in [25].
16Section 5-7.4.4 in [25].
17Section 5-10 in [25].
18Independence is only requested for confirmation measures, see section
III-C7.
Table IX: Verification Process Mapping
DO-254 Objectives
1) Derived hardware requirements against which the hardware item is to
be verified are correct and complete.
2) Derived requirements are evaluated for impact on safety.
3) Omissions and errors are fed back to the appropriate processes for
resolution.
DO-254 ISO 26262
Obj
Nr
Act
Nr
Req Nr
1. 1. 5-10.4.5
1. 2. 8-9.4.2.3; 8-9.4.2.1; 8-9.4.1.1b
2. 3. 8-9.4.3.2a
2. 5. 8-9.4.3.2
3. 4. 8-9.4.1.1
4. 6. 5-7.4.4.2
Table X: Process Assurance Mapping
DO-254 Objectives
1) Life cycle processes comply with the approved plans.
2) Hardware design life cycle data produced complies with the approved
plans.
3) The hardware item used for conformance assessment is built to comply
with the associated life cycle data.
DO-254 ISO 26262
Obj
Nr
Act
Nr
Req Nr
1. 2. 2-6.4.3.2; 2-6.4.7.1
1. 3. 2-6.4.8.1
1. 4. 2-6.4.7.1; 2-6.4.8.1
1. 6. 2-6.4.8.1
1. 7. 2-6.4.8.1
2. 1. 2-6.4.7.1
3. 5. 2-6.4.7.1
the different depth of traceability, the omission of inde-
pendence and the less rigour for verification means in
ISO 26262 results in a lower integrity level as requested
by DO-254 ց .
7) Process Assurance: In contrast to the DO-254, the ISO
26262 prescribes the organizational structure for the process
assurance activities in form of responsibilities and their admin-
istrations rights. The requested independence by DO-254 is
satisfied by ISO 26262. Confirmation measures are performed
by persons from a different department or organization. The
DO-254 objectives are fulfilled by a small set of ISO 26262
requirements. The reason is, that two kind of confirmation
measures are responsible to verify work products, output of
processes, and the adherence of the plans. Table X shows
that all DO-254 activities could be mapped to ISO 26262
requirements with a similar intention.
Evaluation findings The required degree of independence
during process assurance is satisfied by ISO 26262. The
DO-254 objectives are addressed with an appraoch that
focused on the same kind of activities. Hence, for this
process the ISO 26262 contributes to the product integrity
on the same level as the DO-254 →.
IV. CONCLUSION
The performed evaluation could be considered as a first
step to get an impression about the differences between the
both standards in avoidance of hardware design errors. The
applied qualitative measure of integrity level, in relation to
the DO-254, results in a tendency that the ISO 26262 will not
reach the necessary design assurance requested by the DO-
254. This is derived from the evaluation findings in section
III-C, where discrepancies for following processes were deter-
mined: requirements capture, detailed design, implementation,
validation and verification process.
An evaluation on the abstract level of standard documents
is not sufficient to come to a final result, if an automotive
microcontroller unit developed with an ISO 26262 compliant
process has a lower integrity level as requested by DO-254.
The provided evaluation findings can be reused for a deeper
analysis on the interpreted level of the standard. This means,
to evaluate an ISO 26262 compliant development process
of an MCU manufacturer with the additional certification
authority guidance for DO-254, that give a better clarity on
interpretation of the DO-254 document. For this purpose, a
contact is established to a COTS manufacturer.
As a further part of this deeper evaluation, the ISO 26262
certification, authorised by an independent accredited organi-
sation like TU¨V SU¨D, is considered. It is necessary to under-
stand how such a certificate is issued. What are the inspection
methods and the focused areas? These have to be compared
against the certification authority approach. Findings of that
evaluation are especially valuable, because it is supposed that
MCU manufacturers are willing to disclose same documents
with a certification authority.
In view of ever growing market share of hardware compo-
nents for safety-related embedded systems [26], such evalua-
tions findings will become of more relevance. It is a benefit
for certification authorities to understand the meaning of such
COTS component standards w.r.t. to their own regulations and
accepted means of compliance. Avionic and semiconductor in-
dustries could both profit from products that consider aviation
concerns.
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